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Radical Islamism and Migrant 
Integration in Denmark: An 
Empirical Inquiry
Marco Goli and Shahamak Rezaei
Metropolitan University College, Copenhagen and
Roskilde University (Denmark)
Introduction
Concerns about "homegrown mujahideen" in Western, democratic 
countries have energized a global debate about the possible roles of 
immigration policies and failed integration in facilitating Radical 
Islamism.1 The ideology of Islamism is distinct from the religion of Islam. 
Mozaffari (2007) defines Islamism in its various forms as a complex, 
multi-dimensional "ideology," a "movement-organization," and as a 
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"form of government." He uses the term "Totalitarian Islamism"—which 
we call "Radical Islamism"—to refer to a brand of Islamist ideology that 
has four essential characteristics:
1. Religious ideology: Totalitarian Islamism draws its legitimacy and its 
tenets from a blend of regressive (past—salaf-oriented) ideology and 
religion. Its means and ideological objectives are explained and justi-
fied as religious duties.
2. Holistic interpretation: Totalitarian Islamism embraces a "holistic" 
interpretation of Islam; that "true Islam" governs all aspects of Mus-
lims' lives. Holism is based on the absolute indivisibility of Dîn [Reli-
gion], Dunya [Way of life], and Dawla [Government].
3. Goal-Hegemony: The ultimate goal of Totalitarian Islamism is world 
domination. This is based on Allah's promise of regency on the earth 
for His "virtuous servants," as claimed in the Qur'an.
4. Means-Legitimization: For Totalitarian Islamists, all means are consid-
ered to be legitimate in pursuit of its ultimate goal.
To be clear, Totalitarian or Radical Islamists are a subset of Islamists, 
generally. Many acknowledged Islamists will distance themselves 
obliquely from conditions one and two, and absolutely from conditions 
three and four above.2
After World War II, large numbers of people from "Muslim countries" 
immigrated to Europe. As Leiken (2005) notes:
"Today Muslims constitute the majority of immigrants in most 
Western European countries, including Belgium, France, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands, and is also the largest single compo-
nent of the immigrant population in the United Kingdom. Exact 
numbers are hard to come by because Western censuses rely ask 
respondents about their faith. But it is estimated that between fif-
teen and twenty million Muslims now call Europe home and 
make up 4–5% of its total population."3
In many of these Western European countries, immigration policies and 
practices are designed to facilitate acculturation (adapting to the norms of 
the dominant culture), and sometimes assimilation (adopting the norms 
of the dominant culture). The intended objective, however, is integration; 
to help migrants "fit in" to the social, political, and educational systems 
and to find a suitable place in the labor market. Host nations hope that 
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their new residents—and their successive generations—will become suc-
cessful, well-functioning, and loyal members of a democratic society. The 
social contract is that migrants will make efforts to learn the language and 
customs, to find a job, and to contribute to—if not participate in—the host 
nation's prosperity, while the government, for its part, will provide facili-
ties, services, and structures to support the migrants' efforts. Success in 
this process is often gauged by migrants' ability to be self-sufficient, or at 
least not posing a burden/cost to the state. (Danish Law of Integration, 
2007)
The European Open Coordination System's (EOCS) Migrant Integration 
Policy Index (MIPEX) measures policies to integrate migrants in twenty-
five EU Member States and three non-EU countries. The agency currently 
uses over 200 indicators (still developing) covering seven policy areas in 
order to create a multi-dimensional picture of migrants' journeys to full 
citizenship, relative to "European standards of best practice."4 The seven 
MIPEX policy domains include: labor market access, family reunion for 
third-country nationals, long-term residence, political participation, 
access to nationality (citizenship), anti-discrimination, and education. It 
also considers migrants' ambitions for active citizenship in the new 
country.
Integration—at a national and international level—is often viewed as a 
top-down process. In the top-down model, the fundamental policy ques-
tions for assessing integration are: What do the government and the for-
mal institutions do to facilitate the integration of migrants and 
descendants? And how they could improve their efforts?
Recognizing the importance of the bottom-up processes during recent 
years, a supplementary (or alternative) focus has been introduced, where 
the issue at hand is rather: "What do immigrants and descendants do to 
integrate themselves into the host societies? In other words, do they actu-
ally utilize the mechanisms and opportunities created for them? This sup-
plementary/alternative approach emphasizes immigrants' and 
descendants' actual participation, adjustment to and adoption of basic 
cultural values and norms of the host society, changes in the cognitive 
schemas at collective and individual level among migrants, as well as 
changes in their behavioral preferences, priorities, and attitudes.5 Adapt-
ing to the host society's language is a particularly critical dimension, 
which both reflects and facilitates cultural adaptation and value adjust-
ment through social interactions.
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Considering both kinds of processes, we define integration as follows: 
"Integration refers to the total outcomes of top-down and bottom-up 
(formal and substantial) processes, policies, and efforts, measured by 
quantifiable evidence and subjective beliefs about being anchored in a 
system socioeconomically and also with regard to cognition, attitudes, 
preferences, and actual behavior.6, 7 Above all, it involves a substantial 
association and affiliation with a certain value system into which the 
subjects are integrating."
Whether and how immigrants successfully integrate into the host society 
(or even whether they should) is a complicated question that has been the 
topic of much research and debate. But in an attempt to explain the recent 
rise of militant Islamist ideologies around the world—including in West-
ern nations, some analysts have suggested that failed (unsuccessful) inte-
gration may be to blame. The proposition is that the absence of 
socioeconomic success, unemployment, poverty, alienation, and discrimi-
nation motivates young Muslims in Western countries towards Radical 
Islamist worldviews. The report Radicalisation, Recruitment, and the EU 
Counter-radicalization Strategy notes specifically: "poor integration and 
exclusion of Muslims in Western societies might lay a significant founda-
tion for radicalisation and polarization."8 The present study seeks to test 
that idea empirically.
Methods
In this study, we examine empirically (a) the relationship between socio-
economic and cultural integration, and (b) whether the link between 
those factors is related to "Radical Islamism." In order to empirically 
elaborate on whether the assumed negative relation between socioeco-
nomic and cultural integration on the one hand and home-grown radical 
Islamism on the other is statistically true or false, we decided first to elab-
orate on the core attributes of the concept "Radical Islamism."
Measuring Radical Islamism
The multi-staged process by which we explored and operationally defined 
"Radical Islamism" has been described extensively elsewhere (see Goli & 
Rezaei, 2010). Briefly, our approach, based in phenomenological theory 
and grounded theory, began with a series of explorative, in-depth inter-
views with young practicing Muslims, Islamic leaders, academics, and 
community professionals. We translated the concepts and themes from 
these interviews into a set of structured questions, which were embedded 
in a larger, nationally representative telephone survey of youth (ages 15–
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30) in Denmark with ties of national origin to a "Muslim country" 
(N=1113). A minority (12.5%) who did not profess Islam were retained as 
a comparison group. From eighteen of those items, we developed criteria 
to identify "Radical Islamists" and to distinguish them from secular Mus-
lims, fundamentalists, and even from non-militant Muslims who may be 
sympathetic to Islamist ideals (Weber, 1997).
Based on weighted responses to these eighteen items (see Table 1), partic-
ipants were parsed into four categorical ideological groupings. For pur-
poses of this analysis, Group Four comprises the "Radical Islamists."
•   Group One: Non-Radical Muslims (N=551) comprised about half 
(49.4%) the sample. Respondents in this category largely did not 
endorse beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors that characterize a Radical 
Islamist World view.
•   Group Two: The Least Radical Muslims (N=301) accounted for 
another quarter (27%) of the sample. Respondents in this category 
endorsed some beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors that are also endorsed by 
their more radical counterparts. They take their religion very seriously, 
but their Islamic belief system might be better characterized as 
fundamentalist.
•   Group Three: The Affiliated (N=198) numbered less than one in five 
(18%) among the sample. Respondents in this category endorse funda-
mentalist and Islamist beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors but do not neces-
sarily embrace the militancy that characterizes the radicals. Some of 
these respondents are probably more rebellious, feeling harmed by 
what they experience as global pressure on Islam, but not identifying 
with Radical Islamism. This group may be sympathetic to the aspira-
tions and ideals of Radical Islamists, but they do not actively support 
them.
•   Group Four: The Most Radical Muslims (N=63) comprised only 5.8% 
of the overall sample. Respondents in this category endorsed militant, 
radical Islamist beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. They explicitly 
express affinity and support for, and identification with, known mili-
tant, radical Muslim groups.
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Measuring Integration
Also included in the nationally representative (Danish) survey was a set of 
questions measuring sociocultural integration. The socioeconomic 
aspects are addressed elsewhere in the study.9 The questions of how best 
to conceptualize—let alone measure—integration remain highly con-
tested. Based on weighted responses to the eight items below, an "Integra-
tion Point" total was calculated for each participant to provide a 
continuous, scaled measure of integration:
•   Do the respondents have a spare-time job, and if so, is the specific 
enterprise or office owned by immigrants or natives?
•   How often do the respondents use the native language (in this case 
Danish) at work?
•   How often do the respondents speak the native language (in this case 
Danish) at home?
•   How often do the respondents speak/use Danish in their spare time 
and/or in relation to spare-time activities?
•   Are those persons the individual respondent considers his/her closest 
friends natives (Danes) or of an immigrant background?
•   Does the respondent find it proper that his family members work at a 
bank, a supermarket, a pub or café, slaughter house, or in the TV 
business?
•   What popular television programs/series is the respondent viewing?
•   With regard to local and national elections, is a candidate's religious 
attitude taken into consideration by the respondent when deciding to 
vote?
Results
In analyzing these data, we sought to test the following hypothesis:
Sociocultural and socioeconomic integration and Radical Islamism are 
inversely related among migrants from Muslim countries living in a 
Western democracy.
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Table 1: Measuring Radical Islam (in Denmark)
Item Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Do you have a 
leisure-time job * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 6.669a 9. 6 7 2
Likelihood Ratio 6.492 9 .690
Linear-by-Linear 
Association
.026 1 .871
How often do you 
speak Danish at 
work * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 22.369a 18 .216
How often do you 
speak Danish at 
home * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 36.507a 15 .001
How often do you 
speak Danish in your 
leisure time 
(activities) * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 36.453a 15 .002
Are the very best 
friends of yours of 
Danish or immigrant 
descent * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 86.342a 15 .000
Do you think it is in 
contrast with your 
religion if your 
relatives or close 
friends work in: 
A Danish bank * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 123.754a 3. 0 0 0
A Danish mall * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 53.025a 3. 0 0 0
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In a café or a pub * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 139.791a 3. 0 0 0
A Danish slaughter 
house * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 144.243a 3. 0 0 0
Anchorman at a 
Danish Television 
network * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 21.060a 3. 0 0 0
Do you watch the 
following TV-
programs regularly?
Krøniken * Group Pearson Chi-Square 6.195a 3. 1 0 2
Matador * Group Pearson Chi-Square 12.668a 3. 0 0 5
Paradise Hotel * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 4.756a 3. 1 9 1
X-factor * Group Pearson Chi-Square 10.089a 3. 0 1 8
Tv-avisen & 
Nyhederne * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 14.294a 3. 0 0 3
Livvagterne * Group Pearson Chi-Square 2.341a 3. 5 0 5
Nikolaj og Julie * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 12.897a 3. 0 0 5
Forbrydelsen * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 3.780a 3. 2 8 6
Vild med dans * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 17.367a 3. 0 0 1
Hvem vil være 
millionær * Group
Pearson Chi-Square .313a 3. 9 5 8
Robinson * Group Pearson Chi-Square .420a 3. 9 3 6
Item Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/5
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.4</p>Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical Inquiry
89
Smagsdommerne * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 2.829a 3. 4 1 9
Rejseholdet * Group Pearson Chi-Square 5.905a 3. 1 1 6
Anna Pihl * Group Pearson Chi-Square .357a 3. 9 4 9
Go'Morgen 
Danmark * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 4.051a 3. 2 5 6
None of these * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square .181a 3. 9 8 1
When you vote for 
local or national 
Parliament, do you 
vote for a candidate 
with a Muslim 
background? * 
Group
Pearson Chi-Square 120.990a 12 .000
Item Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Goli and Rezaei: Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Journal of Strategic Security
90
Social Attitudes and Behavioral Indicators
First, we examined differences in "integration" item endorsement among 
each of the four ideological categories with regard to social attitudes and 
behaviors.
Leisure-time job
There was no significant difference among the four ideological groups 
(χ2(9) = 6.67, p = .672) in the proportion who held a leisure-time job. 
Fewer than a third (29.8%) of all participants reported having a spare (lei-
sure) time job, with most of those (26.5%) working at "Danish" work-
places, and the other 3.3% being employed by immigrant-owned 
businesses.
Language spoken
There was no significant difference among the four ideological groups (χ2 
(18) = 22.37, p = .216) in whether the dominant language of their work-
place (not necessarily meaning at a spare-time job) was Danish or a for-
eign language. A majority of all respondents said they exclusively or 
almost exclusively speak Danish at their workplace. This was true for two-
thirds (66.7%) of the Radical Islamists (Group Four) and for nearly the 
same proportion (61.7%) of the non-radical Muslims (Group One).
The ideological groups did differ in the frequency with which they spoke 
the Danish language in their private homes. Overall, more than half 
(56.4%) of the sample reported speaking Danish at home almost exclu-
sively or very often. While household Danish was quite common (61.4%) 
among respondents in Group One, it was less commonly (42.9%) reported 
among those in Group Four.
With regard to the use of the Danish language in relation to spare-time 
jobs and spare-time activities, there are no differences across the four 
groups, all around 80%. Data reveals no indication for the impact of the 
use of language in spare-time on Radical affiliations.
Danish friendships
The ideological groups also differed quite significantly (χ2 (15) = 86.34, p 
<.0001) in the extent to which their closest friendships are with native 
Danes or other immigrants. Across the groups, only a minority (14.2%) 
reported that their closest friends were Danes, but there was a linear, 
downward slope corresponding to the degree of radicalism, with the high-
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est share appearing in Group One and almost no representation in Group 
Four. The opposite trend is true for maintaining one's closest friendships 
with other immigrants. Here, there is an upward sloping curve: 81% of the 
respondents in Group Four—compared to 39% among Group One—have 
their closest friendships with other immigrants.
Religious proscriptions
One indicator of whether a person with a Muslim background treats 
Islam's religious code literally is his views about engaging in professional 
activities requiring contact with objects, artifacts, or processes that are 
forbidden (haram) in Islam; for example, contact with alcohol, pork, 
interactions with the opposite sex, charging interest rates on loans 
(Reba'), etc. Accordingly, we asked respondents whether they thought it 
violated their religious code to engage in a series of work-related activi-
ties. There were significant differences among the four ideological groups 
with regard to each activity.
•   Working in a Danish bank: Only 5% of the sample believed it would 
violate Islam's religious code to work in a Danish bank, though the 
prevalence was greater (33%) among the Radical Islamists than among 
the non-radical Muslims (1.5%) (χ2 (3) = 123.75, p <.0001).
•   Working in a supermarket: There were significant between-group dif-
ferences in beliefs about whether working in a Danish market violated 
Islam's religious code (χ2 (3) = 53.03, p <.0001). One in five (20.6%) of 
Radical Islamists believed it was a violation, while only 2.5% of non-
radical Muslims shared that belief.
•   Working in a pub or café that serves alcohol: Again, the between-group 
differences were significant (χ2 (3) = 139.79, p <.0001). Two-thirds 
(66.7%) of Radical Islamists believed that work would offend their reli-
gious code, while only 18.9% of those in Group One believed similarly.
•   Working in a Danish slaughter house: Though the overall proportions 
were smaller, the between-group differences were significant (χ2 (3) = 
144.24, p <.0001). Nearly three-quarters (71.9%) of Radical Islamists 
believed this to be a religious violation.
•   Working as a journalist on Danish television: Here, the between-group 
differences were less substantial, but still statistically significant (χ2 (3) 
= 21.06, p <.0001). Only 12.7% of Group Four participants objected to 
this activity on religious grounds, and only 2% of those in Group One 
were so inclined.
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Television viewing
In the next series of comparisons, we examined differences between the 
ideological groups in the extent to which they viewed one or more of Den-
mark's most popular and well-known television programs. There did not 
appear to be robust and consistent TV viewing differences across the 
groups.
Programs with an historical bent ("Krønikken" and "Matador" (Den-
mark)), were viewed somewhat more frequently by Radical Islamists than 
by non-radical Muslims (15% vs. 5%). In addition, Group Four had the 
highest viewership endorsement for knowledge-oriented quiz shows and 
news programs (74.8% for Group One and 90.5% for Group Four).
Voting preferences
Regarding the questions of voting behavior and religious attitude, results 
suggest that individuals categorized in Group Four are more likely to pay 
attention to candidates' Muslim background when making voting deci-
sions (χ2 (12) = 120.99, p <.0001). There was an upward-sloping curve 
with 7.8% of respondents in Group One and 19% of those in Group Four 
responding positively to the question.
Language skills
With regard to possible connections between the immigrants' language 
skills (Danish fluency) and their integration, a majority of all respondents 
considered themselves to be fluent in Danish at a native level. This was 
true for 68% of the Radical Islamists, and no significant differences were 
discerned across groups.
Residential concentration
Because immigrants are often concentrated in certain urban areas, and 
some immigration analysts believe that hinders integration, we asked 
respondents' views on the issue. Nearly a third (30.7%) of all respondents 
find the residential concentration to be a good, or a very good, idea, 
though the proportion of Group Four respondents who share this attitude 
is somewhat larger (38.1%).
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Cross-ethnic intimate relations
Though we did not ask about the depth and the length of these relation-
ships, we posed the question in the following way: "Have you ever had a 
Danish boy/girlfriend?" which suggests relationships that are emotion-
ally intimate, not just sexual. About half (47.6%) of the sample reported 
some sort of intimate relationship with a native Dane. There was a signifi-
cant difference between the ideological groups (χ2 (6) = 20.57, p = .002), 
but in an unexpected direction.10 Cross-ethnic intimate relations with 
native Danes were more common among individuals in Group Four 
(50.8%) than among to those in Group Three (29.8%) or Group One 
(40.1%).
Leisure and Community interests
A substantially larger share of Group Four respondents have leisure inter-
ests that occupy much of their spare-time (74.6% vs. 55% for the other 
groups). The Group Four members were also somewhat more likely than 
those in Group One to engage in community activities that improve other 
immigrants' integration and academic achievement (30.2% vs. 20.3% for 
Group One).
Discrimination experience
A much larger proportion of Radical Islamists (36.5%) experience dis-
crimination in daily life, relative to their non-radical counterparts (5.8%). 
Most respondents (84.2%) have never or almost never experienced dis-
crimination in relation to work. Less than 10% (8.2%), overall, say they 
experience work-related discrimination "now and then." Parsing by ideo-
logical group, however, the Radical Islamists were more likely to experi-
ence occasional work-related discrimination (17.1% vs. 8.2% sample 
average) and less likely to have never experienced work-related discrimi-
nation (48.8% vs. 62.2% sample average). These differences among the 
four ideological groups, however, were not statistically significant (χ2 (12) 
= 11.94, p = .450).
Arrest
Less than 15% of the overall sample (12.4%) had been arrested by the 
police, but the prevalence was distributed rather unevenly across the 
groups. Only 8.5% of non-radical Muslims had been arrested, but more 
than a third (36%) of Radical Islamists reported an arrest. That propor-
tion is four times larger than in Group One and more than twice as large 
as in Groups 2 and 3.
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Religious associations
Though only a small minority of the overall sample reported membership 
in religious associations, differences between the ideological groups were 
significant (χ2 (3) = 45.23, p <.001). A linear trend was evident, with 1.3% 
of those in Group One and 15.9% of those in Group Four engaged with 
such associations.
Aid/Health organizations
Membership in organizations that focus on social aid and health-related 
matters was uncommon. Just 3.3% of the sample reported such member-
ships, and the proportion was distributed evenly across the four groups. 
Focusing only on these memberships with fellow countrymen, only 3.2% 
of those in Group Four and 1.3% of those in Group One endorsed partici-
pation. Similarly, only 1% of the sample was involved in any "community-
lifting" support activities at the local level.
Organized sports activities
Participation in organized sports activities was inversely related to ideo-
logical radicalism, though the differences were not statistically significant. 
There is a slight linear trend, ranging from 11.4% among Group One 
respondents down to 7.9% among those in Group Four. Though the abso-
lute numbers are small, 3.2% of those in Group Four, compared to 2% in 
Group One, were involved in organized sports activities, specifically with 
fellow countrymen. The differences across groups with regard to these 
activities are too small to foster any ideas about their significance.
Cultural activities
Only 3% of the overall sample reported engaging in cultural activities with 
Danes, and none of those respondents belonged to Group Four. Even 
looking specifically at engagement in cultural activities with fellow coun-
trymen, less than 5% of the population across the four groups is engaged 
in those activities, and there are no significant between-group differences.
Media consumption
There were no significant between-group differences in the reported view-
ership of Danish national television channels, as a majority of the sample 
(82.6%) often watched those channels. The same was true for interna-
tional television channels such as CNN, BBC, and the like, but at a much 
lower extent (25.8% watch those channels often). Moreover, there were 
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no significant differences between the ideological groups in the extent to 
which they watched television channels or broadcasting from the country 
of origin. 40% of all respondents watch those channels regularly, with the 
lowest endorsement coming from Group One (34.7%). A difference was 
evident, however, in the consumption of Arabic-language channels like 
Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, MBC, and the like. Just about a quarter (25.4%) of 
the total sample (and just 15.1% of Group One) watches those channels on 
a regular basis, but the proportion is much higher among those in Group 
Four (39.7%) and Group Three (42.4%). Finally, a difference was also 
noted among respondents who report they do not watch TV at all. About 
one of every ten (10.3%) in Group One respondents were non-TV watch-
ers, but only 3.2% of those in Group Four were so inclined.
Children's school
We also asked respondents about the kind of schooling their children 
receive or should receive. Public schools (without consideration of bilin-
gual pupil attendance) generally were selected by about a quarter (24.3%) 
of the sample, including those in Group Four (23.5%). Radical Islamists, 
however, were only half as likely as others to select public schools with a 
majority of Danish pupils (17.6% vs. 31.6%). Overall, public schools with a 
majority of bilingual pupils were an unpopular choice, with less than 10% 
(8.4%) of the sample—and none of the Radical Islamists—endorsing that 
option. Perhaps the most striking difference between the ideological 
groups pertains to the preference for an Islamic Free School. While 8.4% 
of the entire sample endorsed that option, it was selected by nearly one in 
four of the Radical Islamists (23.5%).
Table 2: Social Attitudes and Behavioral Indicators
Aspect Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
General satisfaction 
with life
Pearson Chi-Square 19.920a 15 .175
Leisure-time 
activities you are 
very good at
Pearson Chi-Square 9.299a 3. 0 2 6
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Engagement in 
voluntary work in 
order to further 
immigrants' and 
descendants' 
integration
Pearson Chi-Square 10.297a 6. 1 1 3
The cause of 
dissatisfaction: The 
authorities' 
treatment of Muslim 
population
Pearson Chi-Square 81.988a 3. 0 0 0
Near-death 
experience
Pearson Chi-Square 52.821a 3. 0 0 0
Dissatisfaction with 
own life
Pearson Chi-Square 38.509a 3. 0 0 0
Guantanamo Pearson Chi-Square 124.635a 3. 0 0 0
Loneliness Pearson  Chi-Square 26.159a 3. 0 0 0
Death in the family Pearson Chi-Square 67.048a 3. 0 0 0
Experience of 
discrimination
Pearson Chi-Square 65.996a 3. 0 0 0
Israel-Gaza Conflict Pearson Chi-Square 155.910a 3. 0 0 0
Iran's Nuclear 
program
Pearson Chi-Square 65.854a 3. 0 0 0
Aspect Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
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Socioeconomic Indicators
Income
For this analysis we categorized monthly income levels to differentiate 
those who are "poor" or "not poor" in Denmark and designated those with 
10,000 Danish krone (DKR) ($1,845 dollars) or more after living 
expenses as "higher income."11 We set "zero" income as the marker of 
absolute poverty. There were some differences between Group Two and 
Group Three, though nothing that illuminates the present hypothesis.
Among self-sufficient respondents with higher incomes, we find that 
nearly 25% of the respondents in Group Four have more than 10,000 
DKR at their disposal after taxes and housing expenses are paid, 
compared to about 12% on average for the entirely self-sufficient sample 
(N=577).
Housing
Housing is another key socioeconomic indicator, which we measured here 
by assessing whether respondents owned a home or were renting. The 
great majority of all respondents (69.5%) were living in rented apart-
ments, and very few in rented houses. There were no significant differ-
ences in home/apartment ownership, with 3.2% of those in Group Four 
compared to 5.0% of those in Group One reporting they owned rather 
than rented.
Educational attainment
Among respondents with the lowest level of formal education, Group Four 
is somewhat overrepresented (14.3%), relative to the other ideological 
groups (7.1% in Group One, 1.1% in Group Two and 5.5% in Group Three). 
Conversely, at the highest educational levels, Group Four (5.7%) is some-
what underrepresented (e.g., 18.6% for Group One). Relatively larger 
shares of respondents in Group Four (20%) are engaged in middle-range 
(college) education.
Educational merits
We compared educational record/merit achievements, recognized in 
Denmark, obtained by respondents in each of the four groups. There were 
no between-group differences in regard to lower, primary-school level 
merits. The Radical Islamists, however, had a greater proportion of 
respondents with professional-level merit (15% for Group Four vs. an 
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average of 7.2% for the other three groups). It is fair to say that medium-
term educations were more typical of Group Four respondents, but there 
is no evidence to suggest that they are more educated than the others.
National Exam Score
Denmark administers national examinations to measure academic 
achievement. Scores range from –3 to 12. We asked respondents about 
their most recent exam score. For each score level, there were virtually no 
differences between the ideological groups until level 7 (roughly equiva-
lent to a C+), where a majority of Group Four (52.2%) have obtained these 
results, compared to slightly less than half (45%) of those in Group One. 
At level 10 (akin to a B+), however, only 14% of Group Four attained that 
score, compared to 21.1% for Group One. Just over 3% of the total sample 
(3.2% of Group Four and 2.6% of the other groups) achieved the highest 
possible score of 12 (A+ equivalent), but there were no significant differ-
ences among the ideological groups (χ2 (21) = 13.13, p = .904). Aggregat-
ing the "above-average" exam scores (to include 7, 10 and 12), the 
proportion of those in Group Four (68.9%) is virtually identical to that of 
the other groups (69%). There is therefore no evidence for differences 
with regard to exam scores across the groups.
Marital Compatibility Indicators
Another dimension of sociocultural integration and accommodation is 
reflected in views on marital compatibility. We asked respondents what 
factors would be important to them in considering the appropriateness of 
a marriage partner for their own child.
Family relation
An overwhelming majority find it of no importance that the partner is a 
relative. Slightly—but not significantly—more of those in Group Four 
(6.3% vs. 4.1% average) find it important that the person is a relative.
Language and culture
There were no differences among the ideological groups in preferences for 
the partner having an identical lingual and cultural background. More 
than half of the entire sample believe it is important for the bride and 
groom to share a common language and culture.
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Professional and educational status
Most respondents viewed professional and educational status as a key 
area of compatibility. Just a third (34%) of the entire sample—and about 
16% of the Radical Islamists—viewed that compatibility as absolutely 
unimportant.
Religiosity
Significant differences between ideological groups existed in the impor-
tance of religious compatibility. While less than half of the sample (39%) 
identified it as being very important that the partner is a righteous Mus-
lim, that feature was endorsed by more than two-thirds (69.8%) of the 
Radical Islamists (vs. 24.8% for Group One).
National background
Only about a quarter (23.3%) of the entire sample found it important that 
the marriage partner be a native Dane. Those in Group Four endorsed this 
item less frequently (12.7%) than those in Group One (26.5%).
Religious Indicators
Among those who professed Islam, we also asked a series of questions, 
beyond those used for ideological group classification, concerning reli-
gious attitudes and duties.
Rule supercession
We posed the question of whether Muslim immigrants should follow 
Islamic law (Sharia) or the National law if the two mandates are in con-
flict. About one in five (19.1%) of the sample, overall, said that Islamic law 
should take precedence, but there was a notable gap among the ideologi-
cal groups, with only 6.6% of non-radical Muslims and more than half 
(55.5%) of Radical Islamists deferring to Sharia.
Death for an Apostate
We asked if a Muslim turns his/her back to the Islamic faith by converting 
to another religion, whether it is proper to kill him/her according to the 
Sharia. Only 1.1% of the non-radical Muslims agreed the killing would be 
proper, but nearly a third (30.2%) of the Radical Islamists endorsed it.
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Righteousness and Alcohol
We asked whether it was acceptable for a Muslim to drink alcohol now 
and then, and still consider himself/herself a good Muslim. Fewer than 
one in five (15.9%) thought that practice was proper. It was endorsed 
somewhat more frequently among the non-radical Muslims, but quite 
rarely (1.6%) among the Radical Islamists. Indeed, a substantial majority 
(87.4%) of those in Group Four averred complete disagreement with that 
idea.
Religious duties
A significantly larger proportion (more than half) of the Radical Islam-
ists—compared to non-radical Muslims—reported adherence to each of 
Islam's religious duties, including payment of Zakat and Khoms (Group 
One=27.6%), daily prayer (Group One=25.7%), Juma (Friday Prayer) 
(38.3% for Group One vs. 76.2% for Group Four), fasting (49.4% for 
Group One vs. 90.5% for Group Four), and prayers of petition (40% for 
Group One vs. 73% for Group Four).
Table 3: Religious Attitude * Group – Chi Square test
Aspect Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
Children's school Pearson Chi-Square 34.771a 18 .010
Marriage: Someone 
from the family
Pearson Chi-Square 14.503a 9. 1 0 6
Some one with the 
same language and 
culture
Pearson Chi-Square 32.512a 9. 0 0 0
Professional and 
educational status
Pearson Chi-Square 35.282a 9. 0 0 0
Religiosity Pearson Chi-Square 120.173a 9. 0 0 0
National background Pearson Chi-Square 15.436a 9. 0 8 0
Which law to follow Pearson Chi-Square 177.222a 15 .000
The extreme case Pearson Chi-Square 152.518a 15 .000
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An occasionally 
righteous Muslim
Pearson Chi-Square 90.798a 15 .000
Inspiration to 
interpreting Islam 
Parents
Pearson Chi-Square 50.016a 3. 0 0 0
Education in a 
Mosque by Imams
Pearson Chi-Square 85.522a 3. 0 0 0
Private courses Pearson Chi-Square 59.553a 3. 0 0 0
Study circles Pearson Chi-Square 10.655a 3. 0 1 4
Books, article and 
the Internet
Pearson Chi-Square 81.620a 3. 0 0 0
Understanding the 
Quran
Pearson Chi-Square 19.576a 9. 0 2 1
Paying Zakat and 
Khoms
Pearson Chi-Square 42.783a 6. 0 0 0
Daily prayer Pearson Chi-Square 72.400a 6. 0 0 0
Juma (Friday 
Prayer)
Pearson Chi-Square 102.896a 6. 0 0 0
Fasting Pearson Chi-Square 94.357a 6. 0 0 0
Prayer/Petition Pearson Chi-Square 81.372a 6. 0 0 0
Aspect Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
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Citizenship/Integration Indicators
Missing their native country
We asked respondents whether or not dissatisfaction in their lives could 
be related to their absence from their country of origin. Only one person 
in the entire sample said so, and that respondent was not in Group Four.
Feeling displaced/alienated
Almost none of the respondents expressed the feeling of being a stranger 
or stated that they do not fit in (in Denmark). Only five respondents in the 
entire sample—distributed more or less evenly across the ideological 
groups—mentioned alienation as a source of dissatisfaction.
Native-country travel
As one measure of native-country longing, we asked how often respon-
dents travelled to their countries of origin. To our knowledge, there is no 
country of origin to which respondents are absolutely not permitted to 
travel. Sometimes such travel can be associated with difficulties and risks, 
but it is not in any case completely impossible. Radical Islamists tend to 
visit their native countries somewhat less frequently than other Muslims, 
but there was no statistically significant difference between the ideologi-
cal groups (χ2 (15) = 19.08, p = .210).
Table 4: Citizenship/Integration Indicators
Aspect Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
How often do you 
speak Danish at 
home * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 36.507a 15 .001
I miss my country of 
origin * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 2.700a 3. 4 4 0
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Formal citizenship
We also explored whether there was a relationship between formal citi-
zenship status and ideological posture. The majority, however, across all 
groups are Danish citizens (58.3% among Group One, and 60.3% among 
Group Four). Furthermore, data regarding dual citizenship indicates 
almost identical distribution across groups, though on a lower level.
How would you 
describe your 
national identity, as 
Dane, as...Turk, 
Somali, etc. Or both 
* Group
Pearson Chi-Square 49.845a 9. 0 0 0
I trust mostly 
television broadcast 
from the country of 
my origin * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 18.461a 3. 0 0 0
How often do you 
visit the country of 
your origin (if not 
Denmark) * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 19.076a 15 .210
Which language, 
beside your mother 
tongue, would you 
like to be fluent in 
(Arabic) * Group
Pearson Chi-Square 114.723a 24 .000
Aspect Test Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided)
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National identification
We asked respondents how they viewed and described their own national 
identity. About one in ten (9.3%) identified his national identity as a 
Dane. The proportion self-identifying as Danes was nearly identical at 
both ends of the ideological spectrum; 11.1% of Group Four and 12.7% of 
Group One. In contrast, Radical Islamists (Group Four) were more likely 
(41.3%) than the sample overall (24.5%) to identify themselves in relation 
to their country of origin. Moreover, while almost a third (62.2%) of 
respondents reported dual national identities, the proportion among 
Group Four members was much lower.
Voting behavior
One of the most highlighted aspects of formal citizenship is political par-
ticipation. There were significant differences between the ideological 
groups in their reported participation in elections. Only 4% of non-radical 
Muslims (and a similar portion of those in Groups Two and Three) said 
they do/will not vote, but 39.7% of the Radical Islamists said they would 
not.
Discussion
Since the most recent rise of militant Islamist terrorism, concerns have 
flourished about the broader challenge posed by radical Islamist ideolo-
gies, particularly as they arise in Western democratic countries. In this 
study, we did not seek to explain so-called "homegrown" terrorism or its 
causes, but rather to test a specific hypothesis about the association 
between migrant integration and radical Islamism within a Western 
European country (Denmark). Some have suggested that Muslims may 
become radical when they migrate to Western countries because they fail 
to integrate. That is the question we sought to address, and our data do 
not support the idea that failed integration in a Western nation is a major 
cause of radicalism.
We explored a broad range of factors associated with sociocultural 
integration and compared them across a spectrum of four ideological 
groups, with Group One representing non-radical Muslims and Group 
Four representing the Radical Islamists. We found few, if any, significant 
differences.
The most radical element does not appear especially vulnerable to socio-
cultural strain. They are no more likely than others to hold a second, part-
time job. Most of them do not. They appear not to be conflicted about 
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speaking Danish at work, though less than half of them speak Danish at 
home. The Radical Islamists were more likely to maintain their closest 
friendships with other immigrants, but they were no less likely—and in 
fact were more likely than other Danish Muslims—to have had a native 
Dane as a boyfriend or girlfriend. Like many other immigrants, they did 
not feel shunned by the emergence of diasporas, but instead saw the resi-
dential concentration of immigrants to be a good, or a very good, idea. 
They watch television and consume Danish media, though they are 
slightly more inclined to watch historical programs, quiz shows, or knowl-
edge-oriented programs.
Though immigrants often maintain some degree of connection to their 
countries of origin, this affinity did not appear to be systematically greater 
among the more radical element. The Group Four Radical Islamists were 
no more likely than others to report that they missed (longed for) their 
native country; no more likely to feel displaced or alienated (only five 
respondents in the entire sample felt that way); no more likely to travel 
frequently back to their native countries; and no less likely to be Danish 
citizens (though they are less likely to vote) or to describe their own 
national identity as that of a Dane.
Moreover, the Radical Islamists do not appear especially vulnerable to 
socioeconomic strain, either. The most radical group was not overrepre-
sented among the poor, but indeed, was somewhat overrepresented 
among respondents with a higher income. They were no more or less 
likely than others to be renting—as opposed to owning—their home. They 
do not appear to be educationally disadvantaged. Though more of them 
do have lower levels of educational attainment, there are also more of 
them who are doing college-level education. In their achievement and 
educational merits, they do not fall behind, but seem generally to keep 
pace with their other Muslim peers.
Taken together, these comparisons do not suggest that Muslim radicals 
integrate more poorly in a Western country. There were some notable dif-
ferences between the ideological groups, however, and these may begin to 
illuminate some of the truly important between-group differences. With 
regard to their sociocultural experiences, the Radical Islamists were about 
three times more likely than the non-radical Muslims to have been 
arrested by the police. Indeed, a third of them reported a prior arrest. 
Similarly, Radical Islamists were much more likely than their non-radical 
counterparts to experience discrimination in their daily lives, though dif-
ferences in work-related discrimination were less common and much less 
pronounced.
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The sharpest and most consistent differences between the Radical Islam-
ists and other Muslim immigrants concerned their adherence to religious 
duties and proscriptions. More than half of the most radical group 
deferred to Sharia over National law, and a third endorsed death as pun-
ishment for apostasy. Nearly nine out of ten completely rejected the 
notion that a person could occasionally consume alcohol and still consider 
himself/herself to be a good Muslim. The majority in Group Four 
reported faithful adherence to each of Islam's religious duties, consis-
tently more than the non-radical Muslims. They were about three times 
more likely to prefer their children be educated in an Islamic Free School, 
and much more emphatic about the need for their children's marriage 
partner to share their same religion. Finally, the Group Four radicals also 
had much more conservative views about the appropriateness of engaging 
in professional activities requiring contact with objects, artifacts, or pro-
cesses that are forbidden (haram) in Islam—for example, contact with 
alcohol, pork, interactions with the opposite sex, charging interest rates 
on loans (Reba'), etc.
Based on these results, integration per se does not appear to be linked to 
sociocultural or socioeconomic integration. In many ways, the absence of 
an association may be unsurprising. Integration—like ideologies—rarely 
develops from discrete, transformative events, but instead tends to 
involve an array of social, psychological, cultural, and contextual factors 
that are dynamic and interactive and that evolve over time. Indeed, even if 
integration is not a cause of radicalization, these results—and the method 
by which we study these processes—certainly raise some additional inter-
esting questions about how various political ideologies and cultural inte-
gration might affect each other. Moreover, they point to a related—though 
perhaps more controversial—question: Is it possible for a person to be 
simultaneously "integrated" in potentially conflicting value systems—e.g. 
the value system of the (democratic) country of residence and that of Rad-
ical Islamism?
As noted in the introduction, we take a fairly broad view of "integration" 
to include top-down and bottom-up (formal and substantial) processes, 
policies, and efforts to anchor immigrants in the host country's value sys-
tem. Anchoring is inversely related to the processes of marginalization 
and isolation, which tend to push individuals and collectives towards 
competing value systems. Kristensen (2000) defines marginalization as 
"… involuntary, incomplete [dissatisfying] participation in one or several 
spheres of social life, where there is a [societal] normative expectation of 
participation."12
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Using Kristensen's definition, we suggest that the most important 
"spheres of social life"—like those of welfare states—are The Market, The 
State, and The Civil Society. The "normative expectations of participa-
tion," as Kristensen puts it, attached to these areas of social life are having 
a job/occupation (which indicates participation in the market), having 
formal citizenship rights (which indicates participation/inclusion in state 
governance), and membership in pro-social community organizations 
(which indicates participation in the civil society). In our study, however, 
there were largely no differences among the ideological groups with 
regard to these core indicators.
Key to Kristensen's concept of marginalization is the notion of "voluntari-
ness," which requires autonomy and the exercise of free choice. While the 
immigrants in the sample were largely self-sustaining participants in 
Danish society, a subset of them—particularly the Radical Islamists—have 
chosen to distinguish themselves from some of the normative—or at least 
"typical"—expectations of participation by adhering primarily to their 
religious value system (rather than a secular State-based value system) to 
guide their behavior. They are, for example, considerably uncompromis-
ing with regard to engaging in professional activities they experience as 
being in disharmony with religious proscriptions. Perhaps this is not an 
indication of marginalization, but rather a bold display of autonomy and 
choice.
While the forces of marginalization push people to the social periphery, 
those of integration pull—or attract—them toward the center. As 
Kirstensen notes, however, it is fundamentally a voluntary process. Might 
this suggest that rather than attempting to achieve integration by con-
straining citizens' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, that respectfully 
encouraging autonomy in immigration policies and practices might be 
even more productive?
The results from this study—while not supporting a link between migrant 
integration and radicalism—do appear to be quite compatible with the 
core liberal (in the non-partisan sense of that term) notion that for the 
individual, integration is a right, but not an obligation. Requiring assimi-
lation—not just cultural integration—of the dominant societal values 
might restrict or deny individual autonomy, on which the citizen's (of the 
plural society) self-confidence (as the manifestation of emotional recogni-
tion), self-respect (as the manifestation of the juridical recognition) and 
self-esteem (as a result of solidarity recognition), is built.13
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Table 5: Survey Items Indicating Radical Islamist Views
Req.a) Question Alterna-
tive 
options?
Point-giving 
selected option
Score
1 What is your opinion 
on Jihad?
Presented "Jihad means to go to 
war for Islam when it 
is attacked by 
infidels."
"Jihad means to 
prepare for war and 
to spread Islam by the 
power of weapon."
(3)
4
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1 Do you think that 
Muslims should 
involve themselves in 
politics?
Presented Yes, but as Muslims 3
2 What do you think of 
Sharia?
Presented "Sharia should be 
followed literarily, 
always and 
everywhere. All 
Muslim countries 
should implement it."
4
2 If there was a country 
that was ruled fully 
Islamic on the basis 
of a literary 
interpretation of 
Sharia, would you 
settle down there?
Presented Yes 4
2 Do you think that 
Islam and democracy 
can be combined?
Presented No 4
2 If the majority of the 
citizens in a country 
are Muslim, would it 
be justifiable to 
institute Sharia and 
abolish democracy? 
Consequently submit 
the public will to the 
law of God?
Presented Totally agree 4
3 Have any of following 
incidents made you 
consider your 
religious perspective?
Presented Israel-Gaza conflict
Iran's nuclear 
program
Guantanamo
3
(3)
(3)
Req.a) Question Alterna-
tive 
options?
Point-giving 
selected option
Score
Goli and Rezaei: Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Journal of Strategic Security
110
3T o  w h a t  d e g r e e  d o  
you agree or disagree 
with this 
statement:"Radicaliz
ation has got nothing 
to do with Denmark, 
but is due to the 
suppression of Islam 
by the West."
Presented Totally agree 3
3 Who in your opinion 
stood behind the 
attack on the Twin 
Towers and Pentagon 
(9/11/2001)?
Not-
presented
Israel
Mossad
3
(3)
3 When is it, in your 
opinion, both 
legitimate and correct 
according to Islam for 
a Muslim to resort to 
weapon?
Presented When Islam is in 
danger 
3
3W h a t  w a s  t h e  
American invasion of 
Iraq and Afghanistan 
about, in your 
opinion?
Not-
presented
The West wants to 
own and rule the 
whole world.
The West thinks its 
own culture is better 
than all the others.
4
(3)
Req.a) Question Alterna-
tive 
options?
Point-giving 
selected option
Score
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4 The publishing of the 
Mohammed cartoons 
led to a 
comprehensive crisis 
in Denmark and 
abroad, as well as 
raising the awareness 
of Islamic identity. To 
what degree do you 
agree or disagree with 
this statement:
"I consider travelling 
to an occupied 
Muslim country to 
fight for Islam?"
Presented Totally agree  5
4T o  a i d  t h e  
establishment of an 
Islamic state one 
should:
Presented Expel the infidels by 
all means/forces
5
4 Do you agree with the 
statement that:
"A true Muslim is a 
person who is willing 
to sacrifice his/her 
life in armed fight for 
Islam?"
"A true Muslim is a 
person who assists 
Mujahideen in their 
armed fight against 
the infidels?"
Presented Totally agree
Totally agree
 5
(5)
Req.a) Question Alterna-
tive 
options?
Point-giving 
selected option
Score
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4 Who in your opinion 
represents Islam best 
in Denmark?
Presented Hizb-Ut-Tahrir
The terror detainees 
from Vollsmose
(4)
5
4 What country or 
group do you think 
represents the true 
Islam globally?
Not 
presented
Al-Qaida
The Taliban
Hizb-Ut-Tahrir
 Hamas
5
(4)
(4)
(3)
4 Do you experience 
that Islam is 
endangered or under 
attack currently?
Presented Yes, Islam is in 
danger
5
4 It is one o'clock at 
night. The doorbell 
rings. Outside is a 
holy warrior on the 
run from the police. 
He wants housing 
this single night. 
What ought the 
Muslim person to do?
Presented Offer him housing 
and ask no further 
questions
5
Maximum Possible Points
Group One Classification
Group Two Classification
Group Three Classification
Group Four Classification
74
0–14
15–25
25–39
40–74
Req.a) Question Alterna-
tive 
options?
Point-giving 
selected option
Score
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/5
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.4</p>Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical Inquiry
113
References
1   Robert S. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," Foreign Affairs, 84:4 (Jul–Aug 2005): 
120–135.
2   Islamists and Islamic Radicals are quite often in conflict with each other. The most 
telling examples are the conflicts between Conservatives and Reformists in contem-
porary Iran.
3   Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," p. 122.
4   See: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), British Council and Migration Pol-
icy Group, available at: http://www.integrationindex.eu/.
5   Gundelack, Peter & Nørregård-Nielsen, "Værdier og normer blandt udlændinge og 
dasnkere," Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere Ogintegration, March 2007, 
available at: http://tinyurl.com/csxbaq9 (www.nyidanmark.dk/bibliotek/pub-
likationer/rapporter/2007/taenketanken_vaerdier_og_normer.pdf).
6   As measured by MIPEX.
7   As measured by Gundelack & Nørregård-Nielsen (2007) in the Danish context.
8   Netherlands Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (COT), "Radicali-
sation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy," November 17, 
2008, p. 19, available at: http://tinyurl.com/ce2hl7n (www.transnationalterror-
ism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%207.pdf).
9   See: Goli, M. and S. Rezaei, House of War—Islamic Radicalisation among Muslim 
Youth in Denmark (McMaster University, Canada: McMaster Innovation Press, 
2010).
10   Two cells (16.7%) have an expected count of less than five. The minimum expected 
count is 1.58.
11   There is, however, no official definition of poverty in Denmark. The income levels 
are defined by consumer departments to indicate different levels of incomes neces-
sary to maintain an affluent life, a normal life, a discount life, a life in relative pov-
erty, and absolute poverty.
12   Christensen, K. J. "Marginalisering—En begrebsudredning," in J.E. Larsen, Iver 
Hornemann Møller, and Jens Lind (eds.), Kontinuitet og forandring: kontinu-
iteter og forandringer i samfundets differentierings- og integrationsformer (Den-
mark: Samfundslitteratur, 2000).
13   Honneth, Axel, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Con-
flicts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
Goli and Rezaei: Radical Islamism and Migrant Integration in Denmark: An Empirical
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Journal of Strategic Security
114
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/5
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.4</p>